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Cognitive neuroscientists often study social cognition by using simple but socially relevant
stimuli, such as schematic faces or images of other people. Whilst this research is
valuable, important aspects of genuine social encounters are absent from these studies,
a fact that has recently drawn criticism. In the present review we argue for an empirical
approach to the determination of the equivalence of different social stimuli. This approach
involves the systematic comparison of different types of social stimuli ranging in their
approximation to a real social interaction. In garnering support for this cognitive ethological
approach, we focus on recent research in social attention that has involved stimuli ranging
from simple schematic faces to real social interactions. We highlight both meaningful
similarities and differences in various social attentional phenomena across these different
types of social stimuli thus validating the utility of the research initiative. Furthermore, we
argue that exploring these similarities and differences will provide new insights into social
cognition and social neuroscience.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario. You are walking down a busy city
street and you see a life size mural of two people sitting down eat-
ing ameal. You approach themural and inspect it. This inspection
will likely involve a characteristic pattern of eye movements and
brain activity. Now imagine walking down that same busy city
street and you see two real people sitting down eating a meal. You
approach and inspect them. This inspection will also involve a
characteristic pattern of eye movements and brain activity. The
question motivating the present review is the extent to which
researchers should expect the patterns across these situations to
be qualitatively and quantitatively equivalent and, more funda-
mentally, how to approach such a question. This issue has recently
surfaced in the context of research on social neuroscience given
its reliance on stimuli more akin to the first scenario (e.g., sim-
ple, static representations of socially relevant stimuli) than the
second scenario (e.g., an actual live social interaction) in attempt-
ing to map the social brain. One of the critical assumptions
driving social neuroscience is that the knowledge gained about
the social brain using the former class of stimuli will generalize
to the richer scenarios associated with everyday social cogni-
tion. However, as others have remarked, this could prove to be a
dangerous assumption (Neisser, 1978; Ochsner, 2004; Schilbach
et al., 2006; Kingstone et al., 2008; Kingstone, 2009; Zaki and
Ochsner, 2009). That said, it is important that this concern not
turn into a presumption of non-equivalence (see Mook, 1983).
Rather, we argue for an empirical approach to the determination
of the equivalence of different social stimuli. Specifically, we argue
for the systematic comparison of different types of social stimuli
ranging in their approximation to a real social interaction as a
means to address issues about the equivalence of social stimuli
and as a means to provide new insights into social cognition and
social neuroscience.
OVERVIEW
In the review that follows, we describe a number of studies
in the context of social attention research that assess putatively
social phenomena in different environments ranging in their
approximation to a real social interaction. While it is difficult to
operationalize the extent to which a stimulus approximates a real
social interaction, we have tried to sample stimuli that would span
the implied continuum. Toward this end, we discuss social atten-
tion research using static schematic faces, dynamic schematic
faces, static photographs of faces, static photographs of people
in complex social scenes (e.g., people having lunch), dynamic
images of people in complex social scenes (e.g., a movie), situ-
ations with the potential for real social interaction (e.g., walking
down a street), and real social interactions (e.g., in conversation).
By focusing our review on the social attention literature, it allows
us to engage the discussion about the equivalence of social stim-
uli within a common framework, though the issues are by no
means restricted to social attention. This review is not meant to
be exhaustive; instead the review focuses on research that high-
lights both similarities and differences in how we attend to social
stimuli that vary in their approximation to a real social inter-
action. Thus, the purpose is not to simply advocate for the use
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of more naturalistic stimuli (as others have done) but to pro-
vide examples that testify to the utility (and necessity) of such an
approach. In this respect the modulations of various social phe-
nomena by the nature of the stimulus (i.e., looking at an image
of a face versus looking at a real face), which is only possible
through comparison between stimuli, provides a central piece to
the puzzle. Thus, we hope to support this special issue’s call to “go
social” by describing some of the work that has “gone social” and
what it has revealed about social cognition and social cognitive
neuroscience. Furthermore, while we highlight relevant neuro-
scientific research where appropriate, it is important to note that
many of the examples provided are behavioral. Nonetheless, given
that human behavior is the bedrock of social neuroscience, the
implications for social neuroscience are no less clear.
Advocating for the use of stimuli that vary in their approxima-
tion to a real social interaction in the context of studying social
cognitive neuroscience is not in and of itself a condemnation of
research using social stimuli that are far removed from such a
situation. These “unnaturalistic” stimuli have clear benefits (e.g.,
control) and abandoning their use is fraught with as many chal-
lenges as neglecting to use stimuli that more closely approximate
a real social interaction. For example, eschewing stimuli because
they are not “naturalistic” would severely limit a researcher’s abil-
ity to isolate the mechanisms that make social cognition possible.
Take for example the point light walkers used in studies of bio-
logical motion. This research has made important contributions
to our understanding of social cognition and social cognitive
neuroscience (e.g., Pavlova, 2012) arguably as a direct result of
stripping away characteristics of the stimuli that might make
them more “naturalistic” on some level. The approach advocated
here embraces the entire range of available social stimuli and
specifically highlights the utility of directly comparing between
them. That being said, in the present context history demands
that an emphasis be put on highlighting the positive aspects of
using stimuli that better approximate a real social interaction as
opposed to highlighting, for example, the positive aspects of the
status quo, though this should not be taken as indicating that the
latter is devoid of such aspects. Extensive discussions of the ben-
efits of “external invalidity” are available elsewhere (see Mook,
1983; Banaji and Crowder, 1989).
Before beginning the review it is important to note that using
stimuli that better approximate a real social interaction comes
with methodological challenges. For example, while monitoring
behavioral and/or neural responses to a picture of two people
engaging in a social interaction is straightforward, it would be
difficult to monitor behavioral and/or neural responses (partic-
ularly the latter) as individuals actually engage in a real social
interaction. Despite these difficulties, we do not see the challenge
as insurmountable, and in fact we will highlight research that
has begun to overcome some of these challenges. Furthermore,
taking on the methodological challenge will likely require inno-
vations (e.g., technological) and new paradigms for exploring
social cognition (e.g., Wilms et al., 2010) both of which would
likely be viewed as welcome. Lastly, even if some aspect of real
social interactions were beyond the scope of current (and future)
methods, this would not negate the benefits of exploring the com-
parisons that are technologically feasible (e.g., comparing a static
schematic face to a real dynamic face). The following review aims
to provide support for these claims.
GAZE FOLLOWING
Folk knowledge suggests that people are very interested in where
other humans are directing their attention. Driven by this intu-
ition, researchers have proposed that eye gaze represents a special
social attentional cue (Baron-Cohen, 1995), and that this cue is
associated with specific neural mechanisms (such as that revealed
by activity in the superior temporal sulcus; Campbell et al., 1990;
Itier and Batty, 2009). Gaze direction can give the observer an
indication of a person’s mental state, their focus of attention,
and their goals (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Shimojo et al., 2003; Tipper
et al., 2003; Ristic et al., 2005; Frischen and Tipper, 2006). This
notion leads to the expectation that where someone looks should
have a profound impact on where we allocate our attention (i.e.,
we should attend to where others are looking). This idea dove-
tails with work suggesting that the morphology of eyes have
evolved for social communication (Kobayashi and Kohshima,
1997) and that we are skilled at detecting the direction of gaze
(e.g., Anderson et al., 2011).
To examine gaze following in the laboratory, researchers have
modified a cueing task popularized by Posner (1980) and used
it to investigate whether people are biased to attend to where
someone else is looking. Typically observers are presented with
a schematic face that looks to the left or right. This is then fol-
lowed by the presentation of a target to the left or right of the
face. Results from such experiments indicate that people are faster
to respond to the target when it appears at the location the face
is looking at (Friesen and Kingstone, 1998; Driver et al., 1999;
Langton and Bruce, 1999). This gaze cueing effect occurs rapidly
(i.e., less than 100ms after the appearance of the cue; Friesen and
Kingstone, 1998; Frischen et al., 2007) and is thought to be largely
obligatory (e.g., orienting in response to gaze occurs even if the
gaze-cue is counter-predictive; Friesen et al., 2004). Gaze cueing
has become a signature of not only the tendency for people to
reorient attention in the direction of another’s eyes but of social
attention in general. The latter point is well supported by the pro-
portion of social cognitive neuroscience papers that focus on gaze
following (as opposed to other potential social behaviors; see Itier
and Batty, 2009).
While the simple elegance of the original gaze cueing paradigm
is laudable, a cursory glance at the simple schematic faces typically
used raises just the kind of question discussed in the introduction.
While the schematic faces and eyes are recognizable as such, they
are clearly not real faces and real eyes (i.e., the ones we presum-
ably follow and have followed over our lifetime). This leads to
the concern that schematic faces could elicit different behavioral
and neural responses than real faces. Consistent with this concern,
Sagiv and Bentin (2001) demonstrated important differences in
how faces are processed when those faces are schematic versus
real images of faces. While schematic faces and real images of
faces generated an equivalent N170, an ERP component thought
to index face processing in the right hemisphere (Bentin et al.,
1996), when the researchers inverted the faces the neural response
was qualitatively different across the different stimulus types.
Specifically, inversion of schematic faces lead to a reduction in
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the amplitude of the N170 whereas inversion of real images of
faces lead to an enhancement of the N170. The authors attributed
the difference to the relative abilities of the two stimulus types to
engage holistic and part based face processing mechanisms. Thus,
even a simple difference (i.e., schematic face versus an image of
a real face) in the stimulus can lead to a qualitative difference in
brain activity in response to that stimulus. Results such as these
underline the potential that gaze processing might be influenced
by inherent differences in stimuli that covary with changes in the
extent to which they represent naturalistic social stimuli.
GAZE CUEINGWITH IMAGES OF REAL FACES
Researchers have discovered important differences in gaze cue-
ing when using stimuli that vary in their approximation to a real
social interaction. For example, Hietanen and Leppanen (2003)
compared gaze cueing using schematic and real images of faces.
While they found that both types of stimuli produced a sig-
nificant gaze cueing effect, schematic faces actually produced a
larger gaze cueing effect than real images of faces. This partic-
ular form of non-equivalence can be interpreted in a number
of theoretically useful ways. For example, on the argument that
gaze cueing with schematic faces is social, one might expect
that a change in the stimulus that made it more similar to the
gaze cues we typically encounter in social interactions would
increase the magnitude of the gaze cueing effect. That it did
not might suggest that orienting in response to schematic faces
is at least partially mediated by non-social mechanisms (e.g.,
motion cues; Farroni et al., 2000). Alternatively, as Hietanen
and Leppanen (2003) suggest, the use of a schematic face could
enhance the gaze cueing effect by reducing the noise intro-
duced by the presence of other facial features (e.g., skin texture)
that are typically present while individuals follow the gaze of
conspecifics.
GAZE CUEINGWITH DYNAMIC STIMULI
Aside from schematization, the stimuli typically used in gaze cue-
ing studies also differ from real faces in that the former are static
rather than dynamic. Motion is an important aspect of face pro-
cessing (e.g., Curio et al., 2010) and gaze following at least early
in development (Farroni et al., 2000). For example, Farroni et al.
(2000) demonstrated that early in development individuals would
only orient to gaze if a motion cue was present (i.e., the eyes actu-
ally moved). While adults do not require such a cue in order to
follow gaze (i.e., static gaze cues yield gaze cueing effects; Friesen
and Kingstone, 1998), research using complex dynamic gaze cues
has revealed interactions between gaze and emotion (Putman
et al., 2006) that are absent (or much less pronounced) using sim-
ple static or simple dynamic gaze cues (Hietanen and Leppanen,
2003). Hietanen and Leppanen (2003) compared a static gaze-
cue and a simple dynamic gaze cue. In the dynamic condition,
a face was presented initially with straight gaze and after a delay
a face was presented with averted gaze, thus giving the appear-
ance of the eyes moving. In the static condition, only the latter
image was presented. Results demonstrated a significant cueing
effect in both conditions and no difference in the magnitude of
the gaze cueing effect across conditions. Furthermore, Hietanen
and Leppanen (2003) failed to find any evidence for an effect
of facial emotion (e.g., happy, sad, fearful) on the magnitude of
the gaze cueing effect using either type of stimulus (i.e., static or
dynamic). Thus, across a static and dynamic gaze cue, the pat-
tern of results appeared similar such that the gaze cueing effects
were equivalent and showed a similar lack of interaction with the
emotion of the face.
In contrast to the Hietanen and Leppanen (2003) research,
Putman et al. (2006) did find an interaction between gaze cueing
and emotion (i.e., greater gaze cueing effect for fearful expres-
sions) when they employed a more complex dynamic represen-
tation of emotion and gaze. Putman et al. (2006) used stimuli
wherein both the emotion and the gaze changed simultaneously
across frames of a video (rather than a two-frame gaze-only
change). Thus, the emotion-based modulation of gaze cueing was
revealed when emotion and gaze changes occurred dynamically
(i.e., a stimulus that better approximates a natural social stimu-
lus; see also Bayless et al., 2011). One potential explanation for
this pattern of results is based on the relative ability of static and
dynamic faces to engage areas of the brain responsible for social
cognition (e.g., Kilts et al., 2003; Sato et al., 2004; Schultz and
Pilz, 2009; Vuilleumier and Righart, 2011). Specifically, given that
the majority of our experience with faces, and faces displaying
emotion, is with dynamic faces, the neural regions dedicated to
processing this type of information may show a stronger response
when presented with dynamic relative to static faces (Schultz and
Pilz, 2009). In a similar vein, it may be, as others have argued
(e.g., O’Toole et al., 2002), that motion aids in facial recogni-
tion either because it facilitates perception of the 3D structure
of the face or because we actually retain motion information
about a face when storing its representation. Consistent with these
ideas, Schultz and Pilz (2009) found that dynamic faces elicited
stronger responses than static faces in face processing areas of the
brain and Vuilleumier and Righart (2011) note that of the lim-
ited fMRI studies that used dynamic faces as stimuli, responses
were increased compared to those elicited by static stimuli in
face-sensitive areas. These stronger responses are also related to
improved learning (i.e., there is a dynamic advantage for learning
faces; Pilz et al., 2006, 2009). With respect to emotion specifically,
in a series of studies Sato and colleagues (2004, 2007a,b) have
demonstrated that dynamic stimuli are better able to engage the
mechanisms that support the processing of emotion. For exam-
ple, dynamic expressions of fear activated the amygdala more
strongly than static expressions of fear (Sato et al., 2004), and
dynamic expressions were more likely to lead to facial mimicry
(Sato and Yoshikawa, 2007b). If the interaction between gaze and
emotion is linked to the effectiveness of the stimulus to engage the
mechanisms responsible for understanding emotion in others (as
seems likely) or social cognition in general, then this could explain
the increasing likelihood of observing gaze and emotion interac-
tions with stimuli that better approximate a real social stimulus. It
is interesting to note that even the complex dynamic stimuli used
by Putman et al. (2006) and others (Bayless et al., 2011) are sub-
tly different from viewing, for example, a video of a real face or
a real face (Schultz and Pilz, 2009) suggesting the need for fur-
ther research. Thus, while the gaze cueing effect is present across
a wide range of stimuli varying in their approximation to a real
(live) gazing face; it is clear that important differences also exist.
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In the next section we consider another salient social attentional
phenomenon: the bias to attend to others.
ATTENDING TO OTHERS
In addition to people’s tendency to follow gaze, researchers inter-
ested in social attention have also focused on people’s tendency to
orient attention to other people, their faces and in particular, their
eyes. Attending to others represents an important pre-requisite to
normal social functioning. In the following, we review research
investigating overt attention to others using stimuli that vary in
their approximation to a real social interaction.
THE EYE BIAS
One of the most investigated areas in social attention research
concerns the bias of individuals to attend to the eyes of others.
This research has typically employed measures of overt attention
(i.e., eye tracking) while individuals view still photos of faces. For
example, individuals will spend the majority of their fixations on
the eyes of the faces in the photos (Walker-Smith et al., 1977;
Barton et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2005). As with gaze cue-
ing, attending to the eyes of others seems to be at least partially
automatic (Itier et al., 2007; Laidlaw et al., in press). Here again,
the eyes are viewed as a kind of “special” cue for social attention.
Indeed, some have suggested that there exists a neural mechanism
devoted exclusively to the detection and processing of gaze infor-
mation (e.g., the Eye Direction Detector; Baron-Cohen, 1995)
though neural evidence for such a module is mixed (see Itier and
Batty, 2009).
THE EYE BIAS IN STATIC COMPLEX SOCIAL SCENES
One potentially important difference between the types of stim-
uli typically used in studies demonstrating an eye bias (e.g., still
photos of faces) and a real social interaction is that in the latter,
the eyes are embedded within a complex visual array consisting
of other objects (animate and inanimate) that could compete for
attention. From research on attention to the eyes during face per-
ception, it is unclear whether biases toward the eyes reflect true
interest in the eyes or a less social phenomenon, such as a center
of gravity effect initially pulling gaze to the eyes of forward facing
images (e.g., Bindemann et al., 2009). To examine this question,
Birmingham et al. (2008) investigated the gaze bias in complex
static social scenes containing one or several people in a variety of
poses either doing something (e.g., reading a book; active scenes)
or doing nothing (e.g., sitting on their own; inactive scenes). In
addition, participants were given three possible task instructions:
to view freely, to describe the scene, or to describe where people
in the scene were directing their attention. Results demonstrated
that even in these complex static scenes with multiple poten-
tial objects competing for attention, participants committed the
highest proportion of their fixations to the eyes of others in the
scene (controlling for the size of the stimulus). The magnitude
of the gaze bias, however, was not invariant across conditions.
Birmingham et al. (2008) demonstrated that the eye bias was
stronger in the more social scenes (i.e., scenes containing multiple
people doing something together) and in the task requiring social
cognition (i.e., describe where people were attending). Thus, the
bias to attend to the eyes of others extends to complex static scenes
and is modulated by “social” factors such as the number of indi-
viduals in the image. Importantly, the latter finding would have
been impossible to uncover had only single isolated faces been
used as stimuli.
THE EYE BIAS IN DYNAMIC SOCIAL SCENES
A complex static scene, like those used in Birmingham et al.
(2008), might provide a better approximation to a real social
interaction than an isolated face, but it nevertheless falls short
in at least one important respect: natural social interactions
are dynamic not static. To address this important difference,
Foulsham et al. (2010) explored attention while individuals
watched a dynamic social interaction. Specifically, participants
viewed a video recording of people taking part in a group
decision-making task while their eye movements were monitored.
Important for the current discussion, Foulsham et al. (2010)
demonstrated that, as with isolated faces and complex social
scenes, most of the fixations on people were targeted at an indi-
vidual’s eye region. Thus, the eye bias was present in a complex
dynamic scene consisting of individuals gesturing, taking turns
speaking, and against a complex background where the eyes were
relatively small. These data demonstrate that the general bias to
look at the eyes is present in static isolated faces, complex static
scenes and complex dynamic scenes (i.e., videos).
While the studies above have identified clear similarities in
attention to the eyes across a range of social stimuli (i.e., iso-
lated images of faces, complex static scenes and complex dynamic
scenes), a recent series of studies investigating the gaze bias
in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has also
revealed important differences as well (Klin et al., 2002; Pelphrey
et al., 2002; Speer et al., 2007). Individuals with autism are
believed to have impairments in social attention. Indeed, marked
impairment in eye contact and responding to gaze during infancy,
childhood and adulthood is a diagnostic feature of the disorder
(Lord et al., 2000). Consequently, autism has figured promi-
nently in investigations of social attention with numerous studies
attempting to assess which aspects of social attention are deviant
in those with ASD (e.g., Klin et al., 2002; Dawson et al., 2004;
Fletcher-Watson et al., 2009; Freeth et al., 2011a,b). Pelphrey
et al. (2002) reported that when (high-functioning) individuals
with ASD looked at static faces they showed less of a bias to
attend to the eyes than did individuals without ASD. This find-
ing is consistent with the general notion that individuals with
ASD have a social attentional deficit such that they fail to pay
attention to salient social cues like eyes. However, van der Geest
et al. (2002a,b) failed to replicate the behavioral patterns found by
Pelphrey et al. (2002) both within a similar task (Experiment 1;
van der Geest et al., 2002a) and using static complex social scenes
(van der Geest et al., 2002b). Freeth et al. (2010) also found
that non-developmentally delayed adolescents with ASD spent
a similar proportion of overall viewing time fixating on the eye
and mouth region of people when presented with static complex
scenes.
The research failing to detect an overall differential attentional
bias toward the eyes of others in autism relied on static scenes. As
with the interaction between gaze and emotion in gaze cueing, the
pattern of findings appears to be different when dynamic social
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stimuli are considered. Specifically, Klin et al. (2002) found a
robust difference in eye bias across an autistic and non-autistic
sample (i.e., a marked reduction in attention to the eyes in indi-
viduals with autism) using dynamic social scenes (i.e., a movie).
Furthermore, they found that attention to the eye region was the
best predictor of group membership (i.e., autistic group versus
non-autistic group). In a recent attempt to reconcile these dis-
parate findings across static and dynamic stimuli, Speer et al.
(2007) compared gaze patterns in an autistic and non-autistic
sample using four types of stimuli (1) social dynamic (i.e., social
encounter in a movie), (2) isolated dynamic (i.e., a single per-
son in a movie), (3) social static (i.e., two or more people in
static scene), and (4) isolated static (i.e., one person in a static
scene). Critically, all of the stimuli were from the same movie
used by Klin et al. (2002). Speer et al. (2007) demonstrated, in
the dynamic social condition, that individuals with autism were
less likely to look at the eyes than individuals without autism in
the dynamic social condition (replicating Klin et al., 2002; see also
Riby and Hancock, 2009), however, they did not differ in any
of the remaining conditions (i.e., isolated dynamic, social static,
isolated static). As with the emotion and gaze cueing studies,
one interpretation of these results is that the amount of over-
lap between the stimulus and a typical social situation (which is
strongest in the dynamic social condition) determines the extent
that a stimulus engages areas of the brain responsible for social
cognition. Thus, with greater similarity between stimuli and real
social situations, the differences between a typically developing
group and a group with social attentional deficits (i.e., indi-
viduals with autism) might better reveal themselves, assuming
these differences are based in the relative function of the neural
mechanisms supporting social cognition. In other words, more
contrived and less socially realistic stimuli may serve to mask
underlying deficits and equate performance across two groups
who, in actuality, perform very differently in everyday social sit-
uations. Whatever the mechanism responsible for the disparate
findings, it seems clear that the nature of the social stimuli may
be particularly important in investigating social cognition in spe-
cial populations. In the following section we move from attention
to the eyes of others to attention to others in general and also
shift to recent studies that have been conducted in situations that
involve either the potential for, or the involvement in, a real social
interaction.
SOCIAL ATTENTION IN THE WILD
The studies reviewed above, and social cognitive neuroscience
in general, have focused predominantly on individual minds
and brains observing representations of other people (e.g., static
image or dynamic set of images). This approach, however, seems
to overlook a defining attribute of social cognition, namely, social
interaction (De Jaegher et al., 2010; Schilbach, 2010). While it
may be difficult to identify the attributes that constitute a real
social interaction (see De Jaegher et al., 2010 for a recent attempt),
the notion of reciprocity or at least the potential for reciprocity
seems to be central. The individuals depicted in images or movies
can neither look back at the observer nor can they alter their
behavior in response to the observer’s actions. In addition, the
observer’s actions cannot influence the individuals in the static
images or movies. These missing elements are potentially impor-
tant provided the view that the neural mechanisms that realize
social attention likely evolved to facilitate this two-way interaction
(e.g., Emery, 2000). In the following we discuss research aimed at
understanding how individuals attend to others in situations that
have the potential for real social interaction or actually involve
real social interaction (i.e., in the “wild”).
Foulsham et al. (2011) asked whether the allocation of gaze in
a live situation was the same as that observed while individuals
watched a video of a similar situation. Participants wore a mobile
eye tracker while walking to buy a coffee, a trip that required a
short walk outdoors through a university campus. These same
participants subsequently watched, in the laboratory, first-person
videos of their own walk or the same walk by another participant.
Critically, by presenting video of the same events to people in
the laboratory condition, the contents of central vision were kept
as similar as possible across the real and movie conditions. This
permitted a comparison of individuals attention to others while
embedded in the actual “buying coffee” situation versus simply
watching a video of someone participating in the “buying cof-
fee” situation (from a first-person perspective). While there are a
number of informative comparisons to be made in this study (see
Foulsham et al., 2011), we focus here on individuals attending to
other people.
In Foulsham et al. (2011), other people were frequently fixated
on in the live and video conditions and the amount of time spent
looking at people was equivalent across conditions. Interestingly,
while the amount of time fixating people was similar across the
conditions, there was a subtle difference in when people were
looked at. Specifically, people in the scene who were far away from
the observer were looked at equivalently in both conditions (i.e.,
live and video), however, when people in the scene were close to
the observer (e.g., were approaching to pass by) they were more
likely to be gazed at in the video condition than the live condi-
tion. This result suggests that when there exists the potential for
social interaction (e.g., the walkers), participants adjusted their
attentional focus, perhaps as a means to deter such interaction.
In a related study, Laidlaw et al. (2011) compared an indi-
vidual’s tendency to look at other people in a live and video
condition. The Laidlaw et al. (2011) experiment took place in a
more intimate setting than the Foulsham et al. (2011) study and
focused exclusively on social looking behavior. Participants were
told that they were taking part in a “real world search” task that
involved wearing a mobile eye tracker. Participants were fitted
with the eye tracker, calibrated, and then told to wait in a room
for the experimenter to return. Participants were unaware that
this waiting period was part of the experiment. Critically, for half
of the participants there was a confederate sitting in the waiting
room and for the other half there was a videotape of the same
confederate filmed from an earlier session. The live confederate
did not interact with the participant but the potential for inter-
action according to the participant certainly existed. Thus, the
experiment compared looking behavior in a waiting room where
the potential for social interaction existed (in the case of the live
confederate) or was absent (in the case of a recording of the con-
federate). The results were consistent with those from Foulsham
et al. (2011). Specifically, Laidlaw et al. (2011) demonstrated that
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participants looked at the videotaped confederate more often
and for a longer duration than the live confederate. In addition,
when Laidlaw et al. (2011) compared gaze to the confederates ver-
sus a baseline non-social object in the room, the frequency and
duration of looks to the live confederate were actually less fre-
quent than to the baseline object, whereas looks to the videotaped
confederate were significantly greater than to the baseline object.
The Laidlaw et al. (2011) results provide a compelling counter-
point to the idea (generated from research using social stimuli
with no potential for social interaction) that individuals are
biased to attend to other people and hints toward the influence
of complicated social norms and practices that may govern social
attention within real social situations. Interestingly, this result
also implies that measuring “social” attention in scenarios that
do not allow for social interaction (i.e., eye movements in social
scenes) may exaggerate the extent to which we attend to others in
everyday situations. Together these results suggest, as in Foulsham
et al. (2011), that a live situation fundamentally alters how people
attend to people. Specifically, when attentional objects represent
real social agents for whom the actions of the observer (e.g.,
gazing) would have meaning, gaze patterns change.
Further support for the notion that the potential for social
interaction alters attention has recently been provided in the
context of gaze following. Gallup et al. (2012a,b) assessed the
tendency for individuals to follow the gaze of others using nat-
uralistic observation. The researchers placed an attractive object
in a busy hallway and monitored individual’s gaze behavior
in response to the gaze of other pedestrians. Gaze toward the
attractive object increased when other nearby pedestrians looked
toward the object, consistent with the gaze following research
reviewed above. Interestingly, Gallup et al. (2012a) demonstrated
that this gaze following behavior was modulated by whether the
nearby pedestrian was walking toward or away from the “par-
ticipant” (i.e., the individual who did or did not follow gaze).
Specifically, when the participant was behind the individual that
looked at the attractive stimulus (i.e., they could not see them)
gaze following was frequent. However, when the participant was
facing the individual that looked at the attractive stimulus, they
were actually less likely to look at it than if no one had looked at
the attractive stimulus (i.e., a baseline condition). Thus, individ-
uals were less likely to follow the gaze of someone who could see
them. Note that in Gallup et al. (2012a) individuals were not only
failing to exhibit gaze following when the nearby pedestrian was
facing them, but rather the individuals gaze was inhibited when
the oncoming pedestrian’s gazed toward the attractive object. As
with the Laidlaw et al. (2011) results, this research provides a
salient counter-point to the power of gaze following in more
traditional laboratory set ups. Similar results were reported by
Gallup et al. (2012b) using a paradigm based on early work of
Milgram et al. (1969). In this experiment, again using natural-
istic observation of gaze following, Gallup et al. (2012b) placed
confederates at a heavily trafficked location and had them stand
and look upward. Important for the present discussion, pedestri-
ans were more likely to follow the gaze of the confederate (i.e.,
look up) when they passed behind them rather than in front of
them. Thus, again, gaze following was dependent on the relation
between the gazer and the gaze follower.
The majority of studies reviewed in this section have involved
potential social interactions between the observer and the
observed. Participants inhabited the same environment as the
other people and were able to interact with them, but situations
were controlled so that no verbal or physical interaction actually
took place. In a recent study, Freeth et al. (under review) again
compared a live condition to a video condition (as in Foulsham
et al., 2011; Laidlaw et al., 2011), but this time in the context
of a genuine social interaction. In both conditions (manipu-
lated across experiments) a female interviewer sat across a desk
from the participant who was wearing an eye tracker and asked
the participant a series of questions. In the live condition the
interviewer was physically in the same room as the participant,
thus replicating a real social interaction with its associated reci-
procity. In the video condition the same social interaction was
completed but the “interviewer” was a pre-recorded video of the
interviewer.
Freeth et al. (under review) demonstrated a number of com-
mon gaze patterns across these conditions. For example, in both
conditions, participants spent most of the time looking at the
interviewer’s face. In addition, participants were more likely to
look at the interviewer, especially their face, when they were being
asked a question versus when they were answering a question.
Freeth et al. (under review) also found a number of interesting
differences in gaze patterns across conditions. For example, in
the live interview there was an eye contact effect that was not
present in the video interview. Specifically, participants in the
live condition were more likely to look at the interviewer’s face
than her body when the interviewer made eye contact than when
eye contact was not made. This was not true in the video condi-
tion. Thus, interviewer eye contact wasmore effective at capturing
participants’ attention in the live interviews.
One interpretation of all of these results is that the mean-
ing of attending to another (i.e., looking at another person) or
attending to what another is attending to (i.e., gaze following) is
altered by the nature of the situation. Previous research (includ-
ing that reviewed above) has consistently shown a strong bias to
attend to people, their faces, and their eyes but studies of interper-
sonal behavior have suggested that in a natural context people will
sometimes avoid looking at others, a phenomenon known as civil
inattention (Goffman, 1963; Zuckerman et al., 1983). Again, a key
consideration is the imminent potential for interaction in “real”
versus “reel” social situations. Looking at someone is a potent
social signal, however, this is only true (for the most part) when
the individual at whom we are gazing is real. Returning to our
two situations in the introduction, you can stare at a mural of two
people sitting down to a meal as much as you like, but the equiv-
alent behavior when those two people are real social agents could
have very different consequences. Risko and Kingstone (2011)
provided further evidence for the importance of social context
for individual’s tendency to look at people by demonstrating that
monitoring an individual’s looking behavior with an eye tracker
will reduce their tendency to look toward a provocative stimulus.
Thus, the knowledge that one’s eyes were being watched alters
looking behavior, a result consistent with the impact of social
presence on behavior (Bond and Titus, 1983; Risko et al., 2006;
Crosby et al., 2008).
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 143 | 6
Risko et al. Equivalence of social stimuli
The idea that gaze takes on different meaning as the stimuli
better approximate a real social interaction was recently inves-
tigated by Pönkänen et al. (2011) using event related potentials
(ERPs) and a design conceptually analogous to those reviewed
here (e.g., Foulsham et al., 2011; Laidlaw et al., 2011). These
researchers assessed differences in face related brain activation
for averted versus direct gaze by a real person or a static image
of a person. Pönkänen et al. (2011) focused on the N170, a
component demonstrated to be sensitive to averted versus direct
gaze. Critically, when the gazer was a live person, the difference
in the N170 between direct and averted gaze was larger than
when the gazer was a static image. In other words, the neu-
ral response to gaze is modulated by the extent to which the
stimulus approximates a real social interaction. Hietanen et al.
(2008) reported similar results. These researchers demonstrated
that direct gaze more strongly activated the approach-avoidance
system than averted gaze, as indexed by electroencephalography
and skin conductance measures. However, this was only true
when the gazer was a live actor and was not true when the gazer
was a static image of another person. Thus, as we have seen at var-
ious points in this review, a putatively social phenomenon (i.e.,
the difference between direct and averted gaze) is modulated by
the extent to which the stimuli are real versus reel.
Further neuroscientific evidence for a difference between live
and video interaction has been provided by Redcay et al. (2010).
They report a study in which participants either took part in an
interaction with the experimenter via video feed (while the partic-
ipants were in a functional magnetic resonance imaging scanner)
or watched a taped version of the same interaction. Thus, in one
condition a live social interaction took place while in the other
participants merely watched an interaction. Redcay et al. (2010)
found increased activity in the live condition across a number of
areas associated with social cognition, including right posterior
superior temporal sulcus and the right temporoparietal junction.
There was also increased activity in the live versus recorded con-
dition in regions associated with attention (e.g., dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex) and reward (e.g., regions within the ventral
striatum). Redcay et al. (2010) also compared activity across a
joint attention condition wherein the participant followed the
experimenter’s gaze to find a target and a solo attention condi-
tion wherein the participants did not follow the experimenter’s
gaze but the experimenter was nonetheless present. Critically, dif-
ferences in brain activity between the joint and solo attention
conditions were specific to the social cognitive brain regions that
had previously been demonstrated to exhibit increased activity
in the live condition relative to the recorded condition. Thus, a
live social interaction was better able to engage the neural mecha-
nisms thought to be intimately involved in social cognition. Taken
together, these findings converge on the conclusions that a “live”
situation fundamentally alters how individuals attend to others
and accordingly how their brains respond to social stimuli.
BEYOND SOCIAL ATTENTION—THEMIRROR NEURON
SYSTEM
The general notion that some stimuli would be better at engag-
ing the social brain than others (an idea touched on throughout
this review) has received support from research on the mirror
neuron system. The mirror neuron system “transforms sensory
information describing actions of others into a motor format
similar to that the observers internally generate when they imag-
ine themselves doing that action or when they actually perform
it” (Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2008, p. 179). This system is
hypothesized to play a fundamental role in social cognition (Frith,
2007; Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2008) as it provides a basis
for understanding the minds of others (e.g., their emotions).
Important for the present discussion are recent findings demon-
strating modulations of the response of the mirror neuron mech-
anism based on the extent to which the visual stimulus is a socially
relevant stimulus (Jarvelainen et al., 2001; Shimada and Hiraki,
2006). For example, Shimada and Hiraki (2006) compared activ-
ity in the sensorimotor cortex of adults and infants using near
infrared spectroscopy in an action observation condition (i.e., an
actor performed a series of simple actions with an object), an
object observation condition (i.e., an invisible actor performed
a series of simple actions with an object) and a spontaneous
object motion condition (i.e., control). Critically, each condi-
tion was also presented live or via video. Shimada and Hiraki’s
(2006) results demonstrated that only in the live condition was
activity in the sensorimotor cortex significantly greater than in
the control condition. When presented via video, the equiva-
lent condition did not activate sensorimotor cortex any more
than it was activated by spontaneous object motion. Jarvelainen
et al. (2001) also demonstrated that responses within the human
premotor cortex were greater when viewing live compared to
pre-recorded human movements. Thus, the human brain’s mir-
roring of others (a critical neural correlate of social cognition)
can be altered by the medium in which the other appears (i.e., live
versus video).
The reduced response of the mirror neuron system to “reel”
stimuli versus “real” stimuli has also been observed in single
neuron recording studies of the macaque brain. Ferrari et al.
(2003), in the context of exploring mirror neuron responses to
mouth actions, reported: “Mirror neurons that, during natural-
istic testing, showed good responses to a hand action made by
the experimenter, showed weak or no response when the same
action, previously recorded, was shown on the screen” (p. 1705).
Thus, similar to the results reviewed above, the mirror neuron
system was less responsive to a video representation than to a
live demonstration of an action. Interestingly, in a recent study
of hand actions Caggiano et al. (2011), in the context of study
hand actions, reported that video and live presentation of actions
actually activated the mirror neuron system of the macaque in a
similar manner. According to the researchers, the critical differ-
ence between the two studies was that in the case where the video
stimuli failed to elicit a strong mirror neuron response, there had
been no initial training task that encouraged the animals to attend
to the location of the video in the first place. In conjunction,
these studies make an important point in the present context.
Namely, the comparison of stimuli that ranged in their approx-
imation to a real action (i.e., live action versus filmed action)
initially produced a pattern of results suggesting some form of
non-equivalence (Ferrari et al., 2003). Subsequent work, mak-
ing a similar comparison, then identified the potential source
of that non-equivalence (i.e., attending to the video stimulus;
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Caggiano et al., 2011). This latter step thus provides a poten-
tial mechanism through which to explain (some) differences
observed between “reel” and “real” stimuli, specifically, the rel-
ative ability of those stimuli to capture/hold an individual’s atten-
tion. It is important to note that this latter insight would not
have been uncovered had the researchers not engaged in the sys-
tematic comparison of stimuli ranging in their approximation to
a real action. In addition, these researchers actually began with
“real action” or what they called “naturalistic action” and only
(cautiously) moved toward less “naturalistic” stimuli. This direc-
tion is the opposite of that typically employed (i.e., moving from
less to more naturalistic stimuli), an issue that we will discuss
briefly below and has been discussed at length in other work (e.g.,
Kingstone et al., 2008; Kingstone, 2009).
SUMMARY
This review has focused on one approach to addressing concerns
about the nature of social stimuli commonly used in social neuro-
science research. This work has typically relied on simple stimuli
(e.g., schematic faces) lacking, at least on its face, many of the
potentially important characteristics of a real social interaction.
This is a critical limitation if the neural mechanisms uncovered
in the former “reel” instance differ quantitatively and/or qual-
itatively from those engaged in the latter “real” case. We have
suggested here that a useful approach to addressing these types
of concerns is to explicitly compare different types of social stim-
uli ranging in their approximation to a real social interaction.
We have highlighted recent research that has done just that. This
approach allows researchers the opportunity to identify similari-
ties and differences in brain and behavior as the stimuli become
more like the natural social stimuli with which our systems have
evolved and developed to deal with.
The current review suggests that the promise of the approach
described here has already started to be realized. The studies con-
sidered suggest important similarities and differences in social
attention across different social stimuli ranging from a schematic
face to a face-to-face interaction. For example, individuals will
follow the gaze of a static and a dynamic schematic face and a
static and dynamic image of a real face. In addition, the bias
to look at another individual’s eyes is present when the stimu-
lus is an isolated face (Henderson et al., 2005; Laidlaw et al., in
press), a complex social scene (Birmingham et al., 2008), and a
dynamic social scene (i.e., a movie; Klin et al., 2002; Foulsham
et al., 2010). Despite these and other similarities, there also appear
to be important differences. For example, dynamic faces reveal
effects of emotion on gaze following not observed for static
faces (e.g., Putman et al., 2006). In addition, dynamic social
scenes, relative to static ones, appear better able to reveal dif-
ferences between individuals with and without a typical social
attention system (Klin et al., 2002; Speer et al., 2007). Lastly,
the propensity to look at other people (Foulsham et al., 2011;
Laidlaw et al., 2011) and follow their gaze (Gallup et al., 2012a,b)
seems to be profoundly altered when there is the potential for
an actual social interaction. The presence of both similarities
and differences seems to falsify any simple notion of equiva-
lence or non-equivalence of social stimuli and, through attempts
to understand these similarities and differences, researchers will
better understand the variables that influence social cognition
in general and how the brain responds to social stimuli in
particular.
COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY
The methodological approach advocated here is based on a more
general framework for cognition and cognitive neuroscience
referred to as cognitive ethology (Smilek et al., 2006; Kingstone
et al., 2008; Kingstone, 2009). Briefly, the basic idea behind the
framework is to begin one’s research approach at the level of the
phenomenon of interest (e.g., real social interaction) and to sys-
tematically move toward the more simplified and abstracted level
(e.g., looking at schematic faces). While much of the research
reviewed here can be seen as going in the opposite direction,
such that researchers have started with simplified and abstracted
stimuli and have moved toward more ecological stimuli, both
approaches have merit and are based fundamentally on the same
notion: to systematically compare brain and behavior at various
levels of abstraction. One caveat should be noted, as Kingstone
(2009) suggests, by beginning at the level of the phenomenon
of interest researcher’s subsequent work can be benchmarked
against the original phenomenon and conclusions can be related
back to what is experienced there. However, when we begin using
a possibly distant approximation to the phenomena of interest,
researchers run the risk of spending a great deal of time, effort,
and resources studying “phenomena” that are peculiar to (or
worse even, products of) that distant approximation. That said,
the purpose of the present review is not to espouse a particular
direction (i.e., from artificial to naturalistic versus naturalistic to
artificial) but rather to champion the act of moving along that
continuum in either direction.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
The promise of social neuroscience is that we can understand the
neural basis of social phenomena. Given the uniquely social envi-
ronment of humans, other primates and their ancestors, such an
understanding will have widespread ramifications for our knowl-
edge of how and why the brain evolved in the way that it did. Far
from being a special circumstance, it is likely that social context
colors the majority of our cognitive and behavioral repertoire.
However, the challenge of social neuroscience, and the impetus
for the current issue, is to bring the social environment under the
microscope of current neuroscientific methods.
We have argued that one useful approach toward this gen-
eral goal will be to compare social phenomena using stimuli
ranging in their approximation to a real social interaction. This
approach has both methodological and theoretical advantages
for social neuroscience. Methodologically the approach provides
researchers with an empirical assessment of the equivalence of
different social stimuli. The knowledge gained from such an
approach allows researchers to make an informed decision about
the stimuli they use while mapping the social brain. For exam-
ple, the review has suggested that in some cases the use of more
contrived stimuli can lead to difficulties in detecting effects (e.g.,
the series of studies investigating the modulation of gaze cue-
ing by emotion and the importance of using dynamic stimuli
to detect it). Thus, the power to observe and measure effects
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might be strongest when the social stimuli closely match those
that make up our social environment. For example, Schultz and
Pilz (2009; see also Fox et al., 2009) have argued that dynamic
images of faces should be used in place of static images of faces
as localizers of face processing regions in the brain. The impor-
tance of such knowledge should not be underestimated given the
cost (e.g., time, money, effort) of conducting research in social
neuroscience.
Theoretically, the explicit comparison between stimuli varying
in their approximation to a real social interaction can yield new
insights into the neural underpinnings of social cognition. This
is true both when similarities and differences emerge from the
comparison. For example, Sagiv and Benton’s (2001) demonstra-
tion that the N170 was comparable across upright schematic and
images of real faces suggest that the neural processes generating it
are sensitive to some common feature of the stimuli (i.e., the basic
structural configuration of a face). The same author’s demon-
stration that the N170 was qualitatively different for inverted
schematic and images of real faces, however, suggests that the
neural processes generating the N170 are also sensitive to some
unshared feature (e.g., experience, familiarity) between schematic
and real faces. Both pieces of information can inform theorizing
about the neural basis of social cognition.
It is important to reiterate that the approach advocated here
does not seek to minimize the contribution of using stimuli
that are not “naturalistic.” These types of stimuli have numer-
ous benefits for researchers in social neuroscience as evidenced by
the progress made using such stimuli. The approach advocated
here calls for the addition of more naturalistic stimuli and, more
specifically, the systematic comparison between stimuli that range
in their approximation to a real social interaction. Lastly, in
some facets of social neuroscience (e.g., studies involving fMRI or
EEG), the approach we have suggested will present methodologi-
cal challenges. Rather than see this as a reason to abandon such an
effort, we see it as a reason to innovate—a challenge researchers
are already beginning to meet and overcome (e.g., Redcay et al.,
2010; Wilms et al., 2010). For example, we have reviewed numer-
ous neuroscientific investigations that have successfully compared
social phenomena using stimuli ranging in their approximation to
a real social interaction (Sato et al., 2004; Schultz and Pilz, 2009;
Redcay et al., 2010; Pönkänen et al., 2011). We are confident this
effort will continue and continue to succeed.
CONCLUSION
Understanding the social brain represents one of the fundamental
aims of neuroscience. This pursuit faces daunting challenges given
the complex nature of social phenomena. This review presents
one viable way to meet the challenge. Future research employing
an approach derived from cognitive ethology promises to provide
further insight into the nature of the social brain.
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